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On the other hand, the historical background of the wrongful
death act shows that it is for the benefit of the widow or next of
kin. The first act of this kind was Lord Campbell's Act' which
provided that the action was to be brought for the benefit of the
wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased. The West Virginia act is copied from this act, except for the provision relating
to the distribution of the recovery. It can be argued that the
legislature intended to retain the compensatory nature of the act
by using the same language because if the recovery was intended
to become a part of the estate and thus change the nature of the
act, specific language to that effect would have been used. The
act also provides that the recovery is not liable for the decedent's
debts, which would tend to show that it was not intended to be a
part of his estate. The court has apparently recognized the compensatory nature of the act in holding that the jury may award
damages to a father for the mental anguish suffered upon the loss
of his only son,7 and that compensation was a proper element of
damages in an action brought under this act.8
Thus it appears that upon weighing these argnents, the
court followed the slight preponderance in holding that there could
be no escheat, and it can be said that the recovery under the wrongful death act in West Virginia is not a part of the deceased's estate.
J. C. A.
DEI-uE
-ALTERNATE

REQUIREMENT THAT PROPERTY BE OF ACTUAL VALUE

-

JUDGMENT AS CONTROLLING ELaEIENT IN VALUE

QUIREMEN.-R

RE-

executed a promissory note for $4000 payable to

bearer. J as agent for R secured a loan of $2400 from a bank for
the benefit of R, J giving his personal note for the amount of the
loan and depositing R's $4000 note as collateral. Subsequently, R
assumed the $2400 debt and discharged the note for that amount
thereby fulfilling the purpose for which the $4000 note was executed, divesting J of any legal claim on the note and affording
himself a complete defense on the instrument. J's administrator
brought detinue against the bank for the possession of the $4000
note retained by the bank. Disclaiming any interest in the note
the bank interpleaded R who was made a party defendant. Held,

69

& 10 VIT. e. 93.

7 Kelley v. Railroad Co., 58 W. Va. 216, 52 S. E. 547 (1905).
8 Morris v. Railroad Co., 107 W. Va. 97, 147 S. E. 520 (1929).
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two judges dissenting, that R was entitled to possession of the note
irrespective of its actual value to him. Baker v. Bank of Miton.'
Incident to the decision of the instant case, as emphasized by
the vigorous dissent, is the general proposition that the property
sued for in detinue must be of some actual value. 2 In a prior
West Virginia case, Hefner v. Fidler,3 where one claiming the
right to rescind a contract on the ground of fraud sued in detinue
to regain possession of promissory notes executed by him pursuant
to the contract, the court held that since the plaintiff had a complete defense, the notes could be of no actual value to him and that
detinue, therefore, would not lie for their recovery. 4 The Hefner
case has been widely cited as authority for this doctrine.' At least
one court, however, has taken the position that the possibility of
being forced to undergo a suit on the outstanding paper would
impute actual value to the instrument, as to the maker out of possession, even if he had a complete defense thereon.,
Apparently a major reason for the general rule that the
property sued for in detinue must be of actual value is the requirement for a money evaluation upon which an alternate judgment
can be based,7 if the article be not forthcoming.8 Since under the
common law an unsuccessful defendant had the election either to
return the chattel detained or to pay the assessed value, 9 a choice
no longer available under our statute,10 the historical necessity for
1200 S. E. 346 (W. Va. 1938), Kenna, J., dissenting, and Riley, J., dissenting in part.
2 Wilson v. Rybolt, 17 Ind. 391 (1861); Whitfield v. Whitfield, 44 Miss.
254 (1870); 3 BL. COMM. 152; (1938) 16 Am. JUR. 950; (1915) 9 R. C. L.
148.
358 W. Va. 159, 52 S. E. 513, 112 Am. St. Rep. 961, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.)
138 and note (1905).
4See Todd v. Crookshanks, 3 Johns. 432 (N. Y. 1808).
2

(1938)

16 Am. JUR. 950; (1915)

9 R. C. L. 148; Bunics, PLEADING &

(3d ed. 1934) § 107.
a Savery v. Hays, 20 Iowa 25, 28 (1865) (possession of the note is important,
and the right to the possession, such a right as the law ought to protect and
enforce); (a fortiori, where the instrument is not overdue and might be negotiated to a holder in due course); Shipley v. Reasoner, 80 Iowa 548, 45 N. W.
1077 (1890); Kennedy v. Roberts, 105 Iowa 521, 75 W. "W. 363 (1898)
(all actions in statutory replevin brought for detention of property).
7 Hefner v. Fidler, 58 W. Va. 159, 52 S. E. 513 (1905); and see CInITTY,
PLEADING (13th Am. ed. 1859) 124.
8 See Wi.VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 55, art. 6, § 6.
9 BRAcTON 102b, § 4; 3 STREET, FOUNDATIONS oF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906)
c. 12, 157.
loW. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 55, art. 6, § 6; also see Dameeld v.
PRAcTIcE

Bills, 88 W. Va. 246, 106 S. E. 629 (1921) ; and Carlin, Bights of a Plaintiff

with Beference to Property Delivered to Him under a Detinue Bond (1926) 32
W. VA. L. Q. 137, 145-146.
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an alternate judgment is at once apparent. No doubt this common
law background extends a lingering influence over present-day
holdings under the statute." The cases are almost uniform in
holding that, where the litigated property is in the hands of the
losing party in the detinue action, an alternate judgment must be
rendered.' 2 But where the winner in detinue is entitled to only a
part of the value of the article by reason of a lien it is error to
award an alternate judgment.' 3 Likewise, the successful party
may waive his rights to have an alternate judgment pronounced
and may accept an award for the property only.14 Similarly,
where the winner in detinue is in possession when the verdict is
returned, omission of the alternate judgment for the value is immaterial or at least harmless error. 6 It would seem, therefore,
that affording complete protection for the successful party constitutes the essential reason for the alternate judgment and that the
reason ceasing, to that exent the rule should cease.
In the instant case, where the note was in the possession of
a third party, one advancing no claim thereon and being ready
to deliver the instrument according to the court's decision, there
would seem to be no reason for an alternate judgment and ample
reason for relaxing the strict requirement as to what constitutes
actual value in an action of detinue.
W. E. N.
PLEADING -

VALIDITY OF JUDGMENT ON NOTE AS

FAILURE TO ALLEGE

OR PROVE

RETuRN

OF

ArFECTED

NOTE FOR TAXATION.-

BY
X,

administrator, in a proceeding by notice of motion for judgment on
a note obtained judgment against petitioners for $850, to prevent
the enforcement of which, petitioners brought an original prohibition proceeding in the supreme court of appeals. A statute provided:
11 W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 55, art. 6.
1"White v. Emblem, 43 W. Va. 819, 28 S. E. 761 (1897) ; Graham v. Bright,

91 W. Va. 233, 112 S. E. 499 (1922) ; Stirling v. Garritee, 18 Md. 468 (1862);
Averett & Griffin v. Milner & Wilson, 75 Ala. 505 (1883).
13 Waddell v. Trowbridge, 94 W. Va. 482, 119 S. E. 290 (1923).
14 Malone v. Davis, 77 W. Va. 120, 86 S. E. 1100 (1915).
12 Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 214 Ala. 433, 108 So. 248
(1926); Gwin v. Emerald Co., 201 Ala. 384, 78 So. 758 (1918).
16 Dykes v. Clark, 98 Ala. 657, 13 So. 690 (1893); Scott v. Howard, 215
Ala. 590, 112 So. 194 (1927) ; Jones v. Pullen, 66 Ala. 306 (1880) ; Finney v.
Dryden, 214 Ala. 370, 108 So. 13 (1926); Shepherd v. Story, 62 Ala. 336

(1878).
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